
Today’s piece builds on our October 18 commentary “Bear Steepening,” in which we examined two yield curves to help us understand the adjustment process. We start with a global depiction of the private equity big 50 investment pools, totaling $4.7 trillion.

Private equity has become one of the most influential forces in global capital allocation, transforming industries, financing growth and reshaping corporate ownership.
(Invest, LinkedIn [November 14]: https://lnkd.in/p/eZv9Jaz7)
Why start with private equity? The idea for today is to see the size of the influence that lies outside of the banking system and publicly traded securities. This cohort is obscure to the eyes of the regulators and opaque to the eyes of the investor: A regulator has a tough time seeing it, and an investor can’t see anything at all.
$4.7 trillion is a very large number. And the distribution is global. So if you’re in the business of investing in debt or debt-related instruments and you are not following the evolution of this large and growing pool, you’re missing an influence that impacts your investment portfolio and, maybe, your decision-making. Today, we discuss that question.
In the United States, the mechanism of finance through the banking system is very well established, supervised, and tightly regulated. The controls and influences that have been put in place by the Federal Reserve and the banking supervisory authorities reflect the dominant objectives of maintaining financial stability, providing strong supervision with regard to capital, and avoiding catastrophes. Those concerns reflect the lessons of the Silicon Valley Bank affair a few years ago. Those are the lessons from the financial crisis that resulted in the Great Recession of 2007–2009. The commitment of the Federal Reserve and regulatory and supervisory authorities is to maintain an operating payment-system structure, to maintain supervision of the US banking system, and to maintain all the component parts within it.
These tasks are separate from the task of maintaining the policy level of interest rates. The Fed deals with interest rates and policy, while it is 100% committed to financial stability.
As we wrote a number of weeks ago, there is a yield curve distribution between the 2-year Treasury and the 10-year Treasury. That curve gives you some insight about the economic outcomes of Federal Reserve interest-rate policy. The 2-10 curve is currently flattening because of anticipation of forthcoming Fed policy rate hikes.
The second yield curve is the secured overnight financing rate (SOFR) with the 30-year US Treasury bond. That ratio gives you an indication about financial stability risk and the policy direction impact on interest rates. In this case, the SOFR-30 curve is influenced by the massive continuing federal deficit.
Our “Bear Steepening” piece discusses those two different term structures (yield curves). Here is that link: https://dkotok.substack.com/p/bear-steepening/.
The biggest financial problem facing the United States is the ongoing $2 trillion plus federal deficit. We are borrowing approximately 6 to 7% of our annual GDP. A way to think about that is to say that we are adding about 6 to 7% per year of additional borrowing relative to our annual income. For definitions of GDP and GDI, see the GDP compensation accounting and the GDI (gross domestic income) computation. Essentially, GDP is a measure for the income side with an adjustment. Investopedia explains:
The calculation of a country’s GDP encompasses all private and public consumption, government outlays, investments, additions to private inventories, paid-in construction costs, and the foreign balance of trade. Exports are added to the value, and imports are subtracted.
(“Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Formula and How to Use It,” Investopedia.)
The bottom line is simple: If your income is rising 3% a year and you’re borrowing 6% a year, your debt structure is working against you with compound interest working against you, too.
At the same time, the United States is in competition with the rest of the world; and the rest of the world is in multiple types of financial structures. $4.7 trillion private equity (PE), depicted above, is one of those structures.
So we have two things going on at once — the supervised banking system and the private system — and they are in competition with each other. When you raise the policy interest rate in the supervised structure, the interest rate in the private equity system automatically goes up. Lenders and sources of funds are constantly making choices between A or B, and they make those decisions on a risk-adjusted basis. If I can lend my money to the United States of America for 10 years at 5%, I then have to compare that option with others. I have to determine, from wherever I am located in the world, what will happen to the dollars and their value when they are paid back to me. At the same time, I have to ask, what are my alternatives both in the private sector and in the publicly traded sector, and how do I measure the risk in the return? That set of choices faces managers of $ trillions in pools of investment funds worldwide.
Remember, the private equity side is opaque. Let’s look at the publicly traded fix-income, US dollar-denominated debt markets. To do this, we’ll use exchange-traded funds (ETFs) and annotate the charts to reflect events in the Trump 2.0 era.
Tax-Free Muni Bonds
The first chart depicts an ETF that falls in the tax-free bond sector, the iShares National Muni Bond ETF (MUB). This chart and the annotations give you historical references, and the chart shows the price change of an ETF that is focused on the US tax-free bond market.

The rest of the world does not participate in this ETF. This ETF is designed for American tax-paying entities that seek tax-free income. Its price fluctuations have reflected the movement of interest rates and the changes in flows in and out of tax-free bonds.
Treasury Bonds
Let’s move from tax-free bonds to a second ETF, the iShares 20+ Year Treasury Bond ETF (TLT). In this chart, we see an ETF geared to the price change of longer-term US Treasury obligations.

TLT’s price trends are straightforward. If Treasury bond interest rates go up, the value of the ETF goes down. If Treasury bond interest rates go down, the value of the ETF goes up. This is a highly liquid ETF that can be turned into cash quickly. It is tradable on US security market, and it is fully denominated in the US dollar.
High Yield Corporate Bonds
Let’s move from Treasury bonds to corporate bonds with the third ETF, the iShares iBoxx $ High Yield Corporate Bond ETF (HYG). HYG is a high-yield bond ETF that shows price changes of below-investment-grade bonds issued by US companies. That debt is a subject of discussion now because of AI borrowings and weaker credits. That debt started out in the obscure private sector depicted in the graphic at the beginning of this piece, but it now includes the public security sector.

High Yield (Junk) Bonds
Let’s move on to the lowest-credit-quality junk-bond level, represented by the BondBloxx CCC Rated USD High Yield Corporate Bond ETF (XCCC). This is the domain of some new AI-related borrowings.

This is the lowest-credit-quality structure. It has the highest yield. It also employs a series of limitations so that the ETF distributes no more than 2% of its investment portfolio in any single issue. That is the way the ETF structure protects the investor because these investments are bonds where there is very high risk and a likelihood that some of them will default. Remember, investors are getting paid for taking the risk, and the yield from the ETF is in double digits (about 11.5% today).
Based on the prices you see in corporate bond ETFs, you can project what has happened to the estimated market values of the obscure private equity represented by the opening graphic. Remember, if the publicly traded securities declined in price, the presumed market value of the private investments also declined in price. You can see one of them; the other is opaque. It’s the opacity that creates the uncertainty about the future.
Investors with skills can examine the financial statements of a public offering, its credit ratings and creditworthiness, and make their own judgments about whether or not they will get paid and what will happen if an entity is unable to pay them. That’s a function of security analysis, credit analysis, and investment management skill. On the other hand, the opaque or translucent characterization of private investments makes these assessments much more difficult.
Think about it this way: When you don’t know, and you can’t project, and you have to guess, you are dealing with an uncertainty premium. It is reflected in concerns about interest-sensitive investments throughout the world today.
At the same time, sovereign debt issues are of growing importance because they, too, face difficulty worldwide, including in the United States. There is no foreseeable reasonable trajectory that shows the political will to stop the persistent 6–7% federal deficit. Furthermore, the 2-10 yield curve discussed above is flattening and that suggests economic slowdown, which means 6–7% could become 7–8–9%, depending on whether or not the slowdown becomes a recession. And I haven’t even touched the issue of the depletion of the Social Security Trust Fund.
Sovereign debt budgetary pressures are growing worldwide. France, the upheaval there, and the repricing of French debt constitute an example. We recently published a guest post by Norbert Galliard about that particular subject. See “France Struggles for Its Credibility.”
We are entering 2027 amid the turmoil of a lame-duck session. We have a president and an administration that has ignored the federal deficit and the risks of rising and compounding debt. He continues to attack the Federal Reserve Board. Interest rate rates are higher because of his policies. He doesn’t like that. He won’t admit it. He won’t do anything to change his behavior. His entire financial history reflects his disdain for debt, debt repayment, and creditworthiness issues.
Remember, this US president has a private entity business operation and has incurred six bankruptcies. Why would anyone expect that, at age 80, he would change his behavior to adopt a more responsible fiscal approach? Realistically, until a new regime assumes office in 2029, prospects for fiscal discipline from the White House appear dim.
The presidency of Donald J. Trump will be remembered for the largest accumulation of federal debt and the most persistent federal deficits in the entire 250-year history of the United States. We must note that the Biden administration also exploded the debt. Trump 1.0, Biden, and Trump 2.0 — with a cumulative 12-year destruction of fiscal discipline — set the stage for 2029.
The United States cannot continue to do what it’s currently doing forever. What happens with bonds, the value of the US dollar, and interest rates worldwide remains to be seen.
A new Congress will hold the purse strings. No politician wants to cut beloved programs. Every politician wants to give something to somebody else. No politician wants to say, I have to change the structure. You’re not going to get what you thought you were going to get. You’re going to get less. We’re going to alter the formula. We’re going to fix the retirement age so we don’t deplete the Social Security trust fund. We’re going to alter the tax structure.
All of these are tough political choices a newly elected Congress must face. Is the Congress up to the task?
Will the financial markets reflect the results? Absolutely yes. Markets will anticipate and adjust. That means volatility ahead.
The $4.7 trillion+ private equity world worldwide is adjusting its pricing as it watches this debt drama in the United States. US investors see the same theater but are likely to be more US centric. But pricing forces are global, not merely national, and the global perspective will be revealed in publicly traded securities. As an example, credit default swap global prices on US Treasury 1-year, 5-year, and 10-year tenors are currently above 50 basis points (Bloomberg).
Kotok Closing Note
Watch the two yield curves. The 2-10 reflects economics. The SOFR-30 reflects stresses about the stability of the US financial system.
Two curves. Two purposes. Two types of surveillance. American federal deficits running 6–7% of GDP for at least three more years.
And there we are as we enter 2027.
Recommended Reading
Jonathan Baird, CFA, “Is the Bond Market Warning Us About AI?” LinkedIn (November 16, 2026)
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