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Putin’s War Beyond the Battlefield

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Putin and Russia’s assault on Ukraine reaches children, foreign recruits, civilians, and international markets including food and energy. We are all paying the price.

Image Prompted by Norm Dempsey, rendered by ChatGPT


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Europe, The Unites States, And Who Pays for Defense

In a March 7, 2025, speech to the Polish Parliament [8], Poland’s Donald Tusk addressed the implications of changes in U.S. policy toward Russia and Ukraine for Europe’s security. In a particularly memorable statement, he framed the situation in Europe:

500 million Europeans are begging 300 million Americans to protect us from 140 million Russians who, for three years, have been unable to cope with 40 million Ukrainians.

Tusk argued that Poland must preserve its NATO alliance while helping Europe develop greater military independence. His central message was that a sovereign Ukraine is essential to Polish security; and a united, well-armed Europe is the best deterrent against future Russian aggression.

Fast forward to 2026. Putin has been busy.

The cost of Russia’s war can be counted on military maps and in casualty reports, but those measures do not tell the whole story. Civilians under bombardment, children in occupied territories, and foreign recruits drawn into the conflict also bear the consequences. This commentary follows “Putin the ‘Humanitarian’” and examines evidence of those costs.

On October 27, I posted a poll on X asking what was the fastest path to ending the Russia-Ukraine war. Of the 179 votes cast, 94.4% favored fully arming Ukraine. This was a self-selected social media poll, not a scientific survey of public opinion, but the results offer a striking snapshot of the views expressed by those who participated.

The Battlefield and Civilian Suffering

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW), in its November 2 assessment [1], described a Russian military campaign making little net territorial progress over the preceding two months while intensifying longer-range drone and missile attacks. ISW assessed that the Kremlin was increasingly seeking to make Ukrainian civilian life and economic activity untenable as winter approaches. That is an assessment of Russian strategy, not proof of what Putin personally ordered in any individual strike.

The October drone totals illustrate both the scale of the campaign and the limitations of available reporting. The Ukrainian General Staff reported 6,473 long-range Shahed/Geran strike drones launched during October, with 4,859 intercepted. A separate Ukrainian Air Force compilation used different categories and produced different totals. Readers should not treat either series as a perfectly comprehensive ledger.

As this commentary was being prepared on November 13, 2026, ISW’s November 12 assessment reported that Putin and Russian negotiators continued to demand Ukrainian territory beyond what Russian forces currently occupy and rejected Western troop deployments as postwar security guarantees. ISW reported continued Russian drone strikes, including 123 drones launched overnight and 124 during November 12. These were ISW’s assessments and reported launch counts as of that date, not a prediction of what subsequent negotiations might produce. [12]

ISW also reported that long-range attacks had killed or wounded more than 7,500 civilians in 2026 through the beginning of November, citing its underlying sources. That is a combined killed-and-injured number, not a death toll; and it should be attributed to the assessment. The November 2 Russian attack on Komyshuvakha, southeast of Zaporizhzhia, struck a school where civilians were gathering for humanitarian assistance. As of the evening of November 3, local authorities reported at least 31 civilians killed and five injured; the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission said it was working to verify the exact casualty count. [13]

For broader context, the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission verified 2,570 civilians killed and 15,211 injured across Ukraine from January through September 2026, a combined casualty total 59 percent higher than during the corresponding period in 2025. These UN-verified figures cover all documented causes of civilian harm, unlike ISW’s separate estimate for long-range strikes, and must not be added to it. [14]

The larger picture is not complicated: A war that cannot be assessed solely by who controls the next village can still destroy livelihoods, energy systems, schools, and the ability of families to live without constant fear. For Putin, damage to daily life may yield political pressure even when military advances disappoint. For Ukrainians, those losses are immediate.

Ukraine’s Children and Occupation Policies

The November 6 ISW Russian Occupation Update [2] offers particularly disturbing material about Russian practices involving Ukrainian children in Russian-occupied parts of Ukraine. The report describes programs presented as holidays, educational exchanges, or summer activities that move Ukrainian children to Russia and expose them to Russian state narratives. Occupation authorities claimed that nearly 6,000 children from occupied Donetsk Oblast took part in programs outside the oblast in 2026. The figure comes from occupation officials and is reported by ISW; it should not be presented as an independently verified count of permanently abducted children.

The assessment also describes new history textbooks portraying occupied Ukrainian territories as historically Russian, and youth programs offering drone-piloting training. These are distinct activities, but they point toward a related objective: reshaping what children are taught about their country, their citizenship, and Russia’s claim to govern them.

It is necessary to be precise here. A temporary cross-border transfer, a forcible transfer, deportation, political indoctrination, and permanent family separation are not interchangeable legal or factual categories. Evidence concerning consent, parental contact, return arrangements, and official intent matters. The documented pattern deserves scrutiny without flattening every case into the same description.

The harm to a child is not limited to physical injury. A generation can lose language, schooling, family connections, and the chance to learn its own national history. A military campaign can be fought against a population’s future as surely as against its present.

The International Consequences

The consequences of Moscow’s war do not stop at Ukraine’s border. Bloomberg reported on October 26 that Russia had widened its recruitment of men from African countries as it sought to offset military manpower shortages [4]. The reporting, based on a presentation attributed to Ukrainian intelligence, cited 699 recruits from Burundi and 530 from Zimbabwe during the first nine months of 2026, compared with 30 and 65 respectively for all of 2025. These figures warrant attribution to the document and the reporting. The precise terms under which individual men signed up, and what each was told, can differ by case.

Additional ISW reporting on November 9 cited a Russian military-linked source claiming that African recruits were being assigned to the 272nd Motorized Rifle Regiment near Kupyansk. ISW also described a Ukrainian military-intelligence radio interception alleging that African recruits had been used as human shields in another sector. These are attributed claims, not independently established findings for every recruit. [15]

North Korean losses are another part of the international cost. Reuters reported in September that Western and South Korean officials estimated roughly 14,000 to 15,000 North Korean troops had been sent to assist Russian forces since late 2024. South Korean intelligence estimated about 6,000 North Korean soldiers killed or wounded as of February 2026 [5]. That estimate encompasses casualties, not deaths alone; and it does not establish the latest total.

The political alignments are also broader than the front lines. On November 2, senior Iranian officials communicated separately with Putin and Chinese officials. An ISW-Critical Threats Project assessment interpreted the contacts as an effort to maintain political and military support amid tensions involving Iran and the United States. Cooperation among Russia, Iran, and China deserves scrutiny; but diplomatic contact is not by itself proof of a joint operational plan.

The War Against Ukraine’s Food Exports and the Cost of Energy

Russia’s war against Ukraine also reaches the international food supply. Ukraine is a major exporter of wheat, corn, and oilseeds; and its Black Sea ports are essential to getting those commodities to buyers overseas. According to a September 11 analysis by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Russian attacks have targeted Ukrainian agricultural production, transportation, port facilities, and vessels carrying grain. CSIS reported that attacks on Ukrainian shipping and export infrastructure had largely halted traffic through Black Sea ports since July 22, sharply curtailing grain shipments. [9]

The attacks have also affected alternative export routes. CSIS reported Russian strikes on Danube River ports, including Izmail and Reni, while Ukraine sought to move grain by river, road, and rail. Those alternatives are more expensive and cannot readily replace the capacity of disrupted Black Sea routes. S&P Global reported in August that strikes on ports in the Odesa region had removed approximately one-third of Ukraine’s grain export capacity, according to its energy research division. [9] [10]

The October 24 edition of Jake Hanley’s Grains & Sugar Weekly illustrates the difference between shipping risks and commodity prices. Hanley reported Russian strikes on cargo vessels around Ukrainian ports while Chicago wheat futures fell 5.4 percent that week amid expectations of renewed peace talks. A decline in futures prices does not mean the danger to ships or Ukrainian export capacity has ended. [11]

The consequences extend beyond Ukraine. Interference with grain exports can raise freight and insurance costs, reduce revenue for Ukrainian farmers and exporters, and strain food-importing countries. CSIS warned that sustained disruptions would be especially difficult for countries dependent on imported staple foods. These outcomes are documented economic risks; they do not, by themselves, establish Putin’s specific intent to cause hunger abroad. [9]

Energy offers a different illustration of the war’s reach. On November 11, the Wall Street Journal reported that a plan to bring Russian diesel to the United States had stalled, with tankers changing destinations or encountering reluctant buyers [7]. Questions about sanctions, law, commercial risks, and whether such purchases would indirectly benefit Moscow belong in the same larger debate. But the report does not establish that Russian diesel had actually reached American ports under this plan. That distinction matters.

At the time this commentary was written, November 13, Reuters reported International Energy Agency figures showing that Russian petroleum-product exports had climbed to 1.49 million barrels per day in October, their highest level since June; diesel and gas oil shipments had doubled to approximately 270,000 barrels per day. Reuters also reported that no Russian diesel cargo had yet reached the United States under the proposed arrangement. Recovering Russian exports and the absence of completed U.S. deliveries are separate developments. [16]

Each of these stories involves people or institutions beyond Ukraine being drawn into the conflict: recruits from poorer nations, North Korean soldiers, diplomats calculating the price of alignment, and companies weighing commerce against policy. They are not equivalent forms of involvement, but together they show that the war is not geographically confined to one country.

Readers Respond

The response to “Putin the ‘Humanitarian’” has reinforced the need for a follow-up. Several readers questioned how American diplomacy, energy trade, and the search for a negotiated settlement should account for Russia’s conduct in Ukraine. Their messages make clear that the debate is about more than military strategy.

One reader wrote: “Why do we aid him when we know that they will never keep any deal that they make with the West?” That question speaks to the concern that negotiations may yield promises without lasting security guarantees.

Another reader wrote in with this to say: “Thank you for everything you are doing to highlight the evil of Putin and fallacy of presuming Russia will ever be anything other than a state ruled by corrupt, sociopathic thugs who disdain a liberal world order.” The language is the reader’s own. It illustrates the strength of some reactions, not an independent factual finding.

A commenter on the original Substack post also emphasized practical help for Ukrainian casualties: “I’m involved with a different charity, United Help Ukraine, which also supports amputees.” Amid the competing arguments over policy, that comment is a reminder of the work involved in caring for people injured by the war.

Kotok note: I have mentioned in past commentary two organizations I support and I encourage you to explore the work they do for Ukrainian and American wounded veterans:

Revived Soldiers Ukraine:

https://www.rsukraine.org

NPLB (No Person Left Behind) Outdoors:

https://www.nplboutdoors.org

Thank you for considering supporting any of these organizations. Your interest and assistance are sincerely appreciated.

Kotok’s Final Thoughts

My judgment is that Putin’s war is doing far more than contesting borders. It is imposing damage on civilian society and drawing people from other nations into its costs. The reported treatment of Ukrainian children and attacks on civilian life merit thorough investigations and accountability when this conflict ends. The November reports offer additional evidence to evaluate, not excuses to look away. Ukraine’s future, the credibility of international law, and the choices made by the United States and Europe deserve more than fatigue and wishful thinking.

1. ISW, Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment (Nov. 2, 2026): https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-2-2026/

2. ISW, Russian Occupation Update (Nov. 6, 2026): https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-november-6-2026/

3. ISW, Oleshky Ceasefire report (Nov. 4, 2026): https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/oleshky-ceasefire-demonstrates-that-russia-has-the-capability-but-not-the-will-to-end-civilian-suffering-in-ukraine/

4. Bloomberg, Russia widens African military recruitment (Oct. 26, 2026): https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-10-26/russia-is-said-to-widen-military-recruitment-drive-in-africa

5. Reuters, North Korean overseas operations and casualty estimates (Sept. 2026): https://www.investing.com/news/world-news/north-koreas-kim-thanks-troops-on-overseas-operations-on-founding-anniversary-4894690

6. ISW/CTP, Iran Update (Nov. 2, 2026): https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-2-2026/

7. Wall Street Journal, Russian diesel tankers (Nov. 11, 2026): https://www.wsj.com/business/energy-oil/trumps-plan-to-import-russian-diesel-stalls-on-the-high-seas-a5b26b66

8. Donald Tusk, speech to the Polish Sejm (Mar. 7, 2025), official transcript (Polish): https://api.sejm.gov.pl/sejm/term10/proceedings/30/2025-03-07/transcripts/108

9. CSIS, How Do the Latest Black Sea Attacks Affect Global Food Security? (Sept. 11, 2026): https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-do-latest-black-sea-attacks-affect-global-food-security

10. S&P Global, FACTBOX: Black Sea grain trade strained by escalating Russia-Ukraine conflict (Aug. 20, 2026): https://www.spglobal.com/energy/en/news-research/latest-news/agriculture/082026-factbox-black-sea-grain-trade-strained-by-escalating-russia-ukraine-conflict

11. Jake Hanley, Wheat Drops 5% on Peace Talks, but Russia Is Still Sinking Ships in the Black Sea (Oct. 24, 2026): TEUCRIUM https://teucrium.substack.com/p/wheat-drops-5-on-peace-talks-but

12. Institute for the Study of War, Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment (Nov. 12, 2026): https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-12-2026/

13. UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine, Mass Casualty Attack in Zaporizhzhia Region (Nov. 3, 2026): https://ukraine.ohchr.org/en/node/588

14. UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict — September 2026 (Oct. 15, 2026): https://ukraine.ohchr.org/en/Protection-of-Civilians-in-Armed-Conflict-September-2026

15. Institute for the Study of War, Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment (Nov. 9, 2026): https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-9-2026/

16. Reuters, Russian fuel exports, oil output rebounded in October after deal with Trump, IEA says (Nov. 13, 2026): https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/russian-fuel-exports-oil-output-rebounded-october-after-deal-with-trump-iea-says-2026-11-13/


David values thoughtful, reasoned, constructive responses from readers. To contact him, please send an email. The subject line should read “Response to [title of commentary].”

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The information posted on this website (including any related blog, podcasts, videos, and social media) reflects the personal opinions, viewpoints, and analyses of David R. Kotok. David R. Kotok is an independent contractor. He may independently receive payments from various entities for consulting, advisory and board functions, speaking fees, book royalties, advertisements in affiliated podcasts, blogs, and emails. Inclusion of such advertisements does not constitute or imply endorsement, sponsorship, or recommendation thereof, or any affiliation therewith, by the Content Creator or by David R. Kotok.

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