This morning, we consider the blur of developments surrounding peace negotiations in Ukraine, their impacts on the Ukrainian-American community in Florida and Ukrainian refugees across the US, and possible outcomes. What will Putin agree to, and can he be trusted?
In “Shoot-Out” (https://kotokreport.com/shoot-out/) I discussed how Ukraine is caught between two powers playing realpolitik – DT 2.0 versus Putin. I offered the infamous clip of the 7-minute Oval Office confrontation among Trump, Vance, Zelensky, with glimpses of some others. I would like to invite those readers who haven’t seen the full 50-minute event to find time and watch it. When you’re done, think about what your impression would have been if it had ended at minute 40 instead of continuing to the Vance interruption and shootout. Would your impression have been different? Do you think Vance was engaged in an ambush? Global impressions were formed from just the short news clip shoot-out — many millions of people worldwide haven’t watched the full 50 minutes: (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7pxbGjvcdyY).
What happened next is a blur that continues as we write this missive. There was a partial, temporary suspension of some US military aid and intel sharing with Ukraine. We didn’t learn how much, exactly. And there may or may be some taking place as this is written. Then aid was reinstated after negotiations in Saudi Arabia, so we are told. Meanwhile, a US-Ukraine deal on rare earths is still up for grabs, as is a ceasefire. Ukraine says it’s ready — how about Russia? What comes next? No one knows. US and Ukraine seem to have made the rare earth deal. What does that mean?
Meanwhile, Russia and Ukraine went on trading heavy aerial attacks after the so-called and maybe ceasefire discussion were underway. (“Russia and Ukraine trade overnight aerial attacks after Putin sets out conditions for ceasefire,” https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-drones-negotiations-ceasefire-3582728f18687434b9b175a2fe2ec727). Those attacks and counter attacks have continued.
“Putin bombs energy plants hours after telling Trump he would halt attacks,”
https://www.yahoo.com/news/putin-bombs-energy-plants-hours-011214554.html“Ukraine and Russia exchange attacks, hours after Trump-Putin call,”
https://www.cnn.com/2025/03/19/europe/ukraine-russia-drone-attacks-intl-hnk/index.html
At the bottom of this commentary is an excerpt from a compilation by Institute for the Study of War. Please take the two minutes to read the four excerpted paragraphs so that you can judge for yourself what American policy is today.
On the home front, two weeks ago, Ted Hesson and Kristina Cooke of Reuters reported that the Trump administration is preparing to deport the 240,000 Ukrainians who fled Russia’s attack on Ukraine and have temporary legal status in the United States (“Trump weighs revoking legal status of Ukrainians as US steps up deportations,” https://www.reuters.com/world/us/trump-plans-revoke-legal-status-ukrainians-who-fled-us-sources-say-2025-03-06/). Via X (Twitter), foreign affairs journalist Olga Nesterova reminded Americans that “These people had to be completely financially independent, pay tax, pay all fees (around $2K) and have an affidavit from an American person to even come here” (https://x.com/onestpress/status/1897611749597020461).
Let’s unpack this. When we’re done, please ask yourself if 240,000 legally admitted Ukrainians are victims because of a political spat that played out on TV. Or is that part of the DT 2.0 political strategy, and the deportation of the legally admitted Ukrainians is not actually a threat to them because it won’t happen? Or are they pawns in the negotiations that are obscure for observers?
My personal disclosure first. I live on Florida’s west coast. There are enclaves and communities of people who are American citizens with Ukrainian heritage spread out between Tampa and Naples. I know some of them personally, in Ft. Myers, Cape Coral, Northport, Venice, Sarasota, St. Pete, etc. On March 15th the roadside line of protestors on University Ave. (near the I-75 intersection for the UTC mall) in Sarasota was two blocks long. There were anti-Musk signs, etc. and there were some signs in support of Ukraine.
Some of my ancestors originated in Ukraine. One was born in Dolyns’ke, Anan’ivs’kyi district, Odessa Oblast, Ukraine in 1875. Another Ukrainian American family I know well (three generations of them) started as immigrants right after WW2. Their origins include partisans in the underground opposing Stalin and subsequently Hitler. One of the family’s original immigrants was in the Ravensbrück Nazi Concentration Camp. The family ancestors survived Hitler’s Nazi occupation and immigrated to the United States with the help of a church organizational sponsor. I know them in multiple generations of children and grandchildren. Their Ukrainian origins are closer geographically to Lviv.
There are also Ukrainians who want to be American citizens in these Florida west coast communities. They, too, are here legally and are among the 240,000 Ukrainians who fled from the Russian attacks on them and on their families during the last three years.
Kotok view — I oppose any Trump plan (or maybe it’s not going to happen) for deportation of Ukrainians who are legally here, who are here with no burden to US taxpayers and who are contributing to their new communities. BTW, I oppose such action for anyone who is legally admitted to the US. IMO, if the United States reneges on its word to a legally admitted and accepted immigrants, what’s left for anyone to believe in when you are foreign born and honor America?
Let’s segue to a political question. Will this demographic cohort and Ukrainian-American community activists coalesce into a political force on the west coast of Florida? We will find out. Some of those conversations are already underway, as you could see if you witnessed the demonstrations in Sarasota-Manatee counties on University Ave. on March 15th.
Will the philanthropies that have been supporting Ukraine be silent? Will those who helped the Revived Soldiers Ukraine (military amputees – www.rsukraine.org) be silent? Personal disclosure: I have contributed to a number of these organizations, including RSU.
Here’s a link to a description of the congressional districts of Florida: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Florida%27s_congressional_districts . The key districts are numbers 12 through 19. One of those congressmen wants to become the next Florida governor. Some of those members of Congress have received the first wave of the constituent pushback against this Trump policy. My Rep. is Greg Steube, and he is hearing from his constituents. Many of the folks in these constituent discussions are registered as Republicans. Some of them watched the very few town hall meetings that have taken place recently. They are now aware that the chair of the House GOP’s campaign arm has advised Members of Congress (including those on the Florida west coast) not to hold town halls so that the pushback against this administration’s actions will not be visible through traditional media (“No more in-person town halls, NRCC chief tells House Republicans,” https://www.politico.com/live-updates/2025/03/04/congress/gop-town-halls-richard-hudson-00210024).
Readers can decide for themselves what they think of a political advisory that says, “Don’t meet with your constituents in a town hall where they live.” A member of Congress (MC) who talks and meets with constituents when the issue is a tough debate is to be respected. Witness the recent series of town halls in Wyoming. But when an MC avoids constituents, s/he is a coward and not deserving of support. That applies to Dems and Repubs. You get elected to represent, not hide.
Now, here’s what happened to Ukraine on March 7 and 8.
(Source: Institute for the Study of War, “Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 7, 2025,” https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-7-2025)
Russian forces conducted one of the largest ever missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of March 6 to 7 as Russian forces continue to adapt strike packages to overwhelm Ukraine’s air defense umbrella by increasing the total number of Shahed and decoy drones in each strike. Russian forces launched the largest combined strike package against Ukraine since November 2024 on the night of March 6 to 7. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 67 missiles including 35 Kh-101/Kh-55 cruise missiles, eight Kalibr cruise missiles, three Iskander-M/Kn-23 ballistic missiles, four S-300 air defense missiles, eight Kh-59/69 cruise missiles, and 194 Shahed and decoy drones. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 25 Kh-101/Kh-55 cruise missiles, all eight Kalibr cruise missiles, one Kh-59/69 cruise missile, and 100 Shahed and decoy drones and that 86 decoy drones and up to 10 missiles did not reach their targets, likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference.
The Ukrainian Air Force stated that Ukrainian forces downed Russian targets using F-16 and Mirage-2000 aircraft and that this was the first instance of Ukrainian forces using Mirage-2000s, which arrived one month ago, to defend against Russian strikes. The Ukrainian Air Force stated that Russian forces targeted Ukrainian gas production facilities during the strike. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and other official Ukrainian sources stated that Russian strikes damaged energy facilities in Odesa, Poltava, Chernihiv, and Ternopil oblasts. Ternopil Oblast Military Administration reported that two Russian missiles struck a critical infrastructure facility, causing a fire. Ukraine’s largest private energy company DTEK stated that the strikes damaged an energy facility in Odesa Oblast.
Russian forces began increasing the number of Shahed and decoy drones in strike packages in Fall 2024, likely to adapt to successful Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) innovations. ISW observed reports that Russian forces began launching between 80 and 100 (or more) Shahed and decoy drones as part of their larger strike packages in October and November 2024, and reports indicate that Russia has increased the production of Shahed drone airframes while continuing to rely on Iranian or Chinese imports for other drone components in December 2024. Russia has likely leveraged the increased production of Shahed drones to increase the total number of drones launched in each strike package. Russian forces launched an average 83.4 drones per strike package in January 2025, an average of 139.3 drones per strike package in February 2024, and an average of 128.8 drones per strike package from March 1 through 7. Russian forces have only sporadically included missiles in the January, February, and March 2025 strike packages, and the 67 missiles launched in the March 6 to 7 strike series is a larger amount than in previous missile strikes this year. Russian forces likely increased the combined number of Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles and Kh-101/Kh-55 cruise missiles in the March 6 to 7 strike packages to inflict maximum damage on select targets in Ukraine while using the large number of Shahed drones, decoy drones, and Kalibr cruise missiles to detect and overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses and mobile fire groups.
Russia will likely take advantage of the suspension of US military aid and intelligence sharing with Ukraine to intensify its long-range strike campaign and deplete Ukrainian air defense missiles. US intelligence has contributed to Ukraine’s early warning system against Russian strikes and its suspension will likely impact Ukraine’s ability to rapidly respond to adapting Russian strike packages. Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) recently reported that Russia is modernizing and increasing its production of Shahed-136 drones and producing a new Geran-3 drone variant. Russian forces will likely attempt to overwhelm Ukrainian air defense systems by increasing the number of Shahed and decoy drones per strike package in addition to increasing the number of missiles in select strike packages to destroy Ukrainian energy and defense industrial base (DIB) infrastructure. Russia also likely intends to force Ukraine into quickly depleting its supply of Patriot air defense interceptors — which Ukraine relies on to defend against Russian ballistic missiles — during the pause in US military aid and intelligence sharing to maximize the damage of subsequent strikes. Ukrainian forces will likely have to be more selective in intercepting strikes as their stock of interceptors decreases with no resupply on the horizon, and successful Russian strikes against Ukrainian energy facilities will likely have lasting effects on Ukraine’s ability to generate power for DIB and civilian use.
A final note. This could end with a Putin agreement to a ceasefire and US participation in security guarantees for Ukraine. But I doubt it. Trump doesn’t want to commit American military security guarantees. Putin knows this. And Putin cannot accept those currently proposed terms and survive. He rules now as a strong man who oppresses his own citizens ruthlessly. Or it could end with the exhaustion of Russia or Ukraine on the battlefield. That too is unlikely, as Western Europe is gearing up for a $1–2-trillion-dollar increase in defense expenditures because they rightly see Russia as a threat. Germany will take the lead. Or it might end with a Korea-type ceasefire that tenuously persists, leaving Ukraine always a hot spot at risk of more war. Or it might end up as something else
